After the 2014 Euromaidan protests and deposition of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula and proceeded to wage a proxy war through pro--Russian separatists. As a result of these actions, international relations with Russia have sunk to the lowest levels since the Cold War. The deterioration of international relations has included individual and sector--level sanctions being employed between the West and Russia. These sanctions have been implemented with the aim of signaling intolerance of Russia's actions in Ukraine, and to promote reform of its aggressive policies in Eastern Europe. To date, these sanctions have not altered Russian policy, but rather have isolated Russia and pushed it towards increased South American and Asian economic ties. Furthermore, the current economic trough Russia is experiencing is not entirely a result of international sanctions, but is instead largely due to the drop in global oil and gas prices between 2014 and 2017. As such, sanctions are not an effective long--term tool with which to penalize Russia. This paper provides a critical evaluation of the international response to the Ukrainian conflict while emphasizing the importance of Russo--West reconciliation via economic integration. To respond effectively to aggressive Russian foreign policy, it is important to consider the inner workings of the Putin Administration and its post--Cold War political economy. With a focus on mutual interests, this prescriptive review puts the Ukrainian conflict and current slump of relations into their proper contexts, while also pushing for the reconsideration of maintaining ineffective retaliatory sanctions.
Introduction
Despite its hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia's facelift of international relations was short--lived.
Yeltsin and the Making of Russian Oligarchy
A key part of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the state--to--private transfer of power. It was this distribution of huge state assets to a relatively small number of wealthy individuals in the 1990s that would pave the way for Russian oligarchy. As a result of this unbalanced transfer of power, Russian economic policy was essentially owned by a handful of wealthy businessman: the oligarchs. Oligarchy and oligarchs, as used in this paper, refer to a small and wealthy elite within the business world that function as major determinants of government policy. This oligarchy has helped to shape present--day Russian political economy, and is therefore important when considering how to deal with the current policies being employed by Russia. Under the YA, mass privatization of state assets occurred. To give one example of many, the energy firm Yukos was auctioned and sold to individuals for a small fraction of its market value (78 per cent stake in Yukos, valued at about $5 billion (U.S. dollars) at the time was sold for a mere $310 million).
1 A result of the transfer of these large state assets was a huge shift in power from government to the private sector. This shift in economic power in turn motivated Russia's policies to become more protectionist with regard to oligarch--dominated sectors such as the oil, automotive, and mining. community have often supplied direct input on legislation before it is passed by Russia's parliament. 3 Russia's privatization reform process occurred over a short period of time. This haste caused a lack of checks and balances, thus allowing the formation of Russian oligarchy through the insider--rigged auctioning of state assets. While the privatization successfully transferred state assets to the private sector, these reforms faltered because the government lacked the institutional framework and political loyalty to counter--balance the power between the state and private sector. 4 With the auctioning off of huge state assets going for a fraction of their worth, the Russian Oligarchs (ROs) were the clear winners after the fall of the Soviet Union. Conversely, the beleaguered state found itself helpless as it emerged from behind the Iron Curtain into a competitive international marketplace. 5 This sudden shift in power from the state to the private sector left an interconnectedness with the state that afforded the ROs the opportunity to influence policy in their favor through the bribing of corrupt Soviet--era politicians.
Vladimir Putin and the Emergence of the Siloviki As Russia entered the late 1990s, the public's opinion of the government's relationship with the oligarchs was increasingly skeptical. The tax breaks, unenforced policies, and heavy hand of ROs in politics contributed to an ever--more antagonistic relationship between the electorate and their representatives. 6 For reasons relating to terrorism, RO--mediated political corruption, and a dwindling public image, an approval poll of Yeltsin's presidency hit an all--time low of six per cent by the end of the YA.
7
It was at this time that Vladimir Putin, with nationalistic ideals, a strong image, and security background, was elected with promises to restore order and reform the relationship between the ROs and the government. 8 In a 1997 interview, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an RO with interests in the energy sector, ironically stated that, "Politics is the most lucrative field of business in Russia. And 14 This targeted enforcement of legislation incited an oligarchical exodus of Russian assets, along with Mafioso--like rent--seeking by the government in the years to come. As many oligarchs left, the state further consolidated its power with the purchase of former RO firms and assets. Government boards control these firms and assets, with substantial membership belonging to the elite politicians within the so--called Siloviki. The Siloviki is perhaps most notably present on the board of the state energy giant Gazprom.
15
With much of the economic and political power in the hands of the Siloviki, the torch bore by the ROs throughout the 1990s and early 2000s was largely passed to members of the Siloviki surrounding Putin, thus creating the current state of Russian silovarchy. 16 The dominant and authoritarian look of the Siloviki may appear to draw stark parallels between silovarchs and oligarchs, but this is not entirely the case. A critical difference between the former and the latter is ownership: ROs generally hold a supermajority stake in firms, while silovarchs are government officials that merely control these large state--owned firms. In fact, the initial function of these silovarchs was likely a protectionist measure taken by 19 It would seem that the transition from oligarchy to silovarchy has been highly detrimental to Russian democracy. Although the oligarchy of the 1990s involved a government that was, in some ways, employed merely to facilitate the demands of a handful of wealthy Russians, silovarchy has seen several further changes since its emergence in the year 2000. These changes include the increased government stake and control of media and ousting of 'political non--government organization', regions in Russia being given less autonomy, and the consolidation of power in the executive branch of government.
20 Of particular concern is Russia's increasing trend of state--controlled and censored media. The media and censoring may be used to skew public opinion and undermine democracy. As a result of the ROs and silovarchs, and despite high hopes for democratization with the onset of the YA, a consistent divergence from democracy has been ongoing since Putin's appointment to the presidency in 1999. Western hopes for democratic reforms in Russia appear to be, at best, far off. Increased state control amid weak democracy means that any major political reform and legislation must go through the tight--knit filter of Putin's silovarchy to materialize. 21 The PA has also pushed for Russian nationalism and the promotion of a carefully--crafted Russian ideal. Although impossible to define precisely, this ideal appears to focus on Russia as a political, military, and economic superpower: a superpower which may redraw state lines by means of force, as was shown with the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in 2014. 24 How ought the world to address the stubborn politics of silovarchy in response to repeated sovereignty--infringement by Russia? Key to Russian foreign policy in the last two decades has been its resources, particularly its massive natural gas reserves. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has used energy prices as a 'soft policy' to encourage former members of the Soviet Union to increase ties with Russia. A good example of its soft policy is its relationship with Ukraine.
25
Depending on the Ukrainian government's stance on Russia, Ukraine has experienced both subsidized and artificially high gas prices. A main concern the West has in Russia's policy with regards to resources, is its consistent use to undermine democracy in former Soviet states.
26
With the ongoing developments in Ukraine, Russia's neighbors worry that this soft policy could progress into military intervention.
The 2014 Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and ongoing uprising of pro--Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine demonstrates the evolution of Russia's soft policy to a highly aggressive foreign policy. Russia's unprovoked military intervention in Ukraine is an affront to both the security and combined economic well--being of Eastern Europe. 27 Should the international community fail to quell Russian aggression in Ukraine and other former Soviet states, there is worry that the malign foreign policy could spread to other former Soviet states and lead to 28 This proxy war, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and the downing of flight MH17 has elicited several responses by the international community including economic sector--level sanctions against Russia, individual--targeted economic sanctions and travel bans of silovarchs and oligarchs (both in Russia and Ukraine), and Russia's exclusion from G8 talks.
29
Although all Western nations are a part of the United Nations (UN), to date the UN has not implemented a binding resolution as a result of Russia's hostile actions. This is due to consistent veto use by Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, on resolutions that seek to condemn Russia's actions.
Ultimately the sanctions, in combination with a drop in global gas prices, have thrown the ruble into a sustained state of crisis causing it to lose 32.7 per cent of its nominal value vis--à--vis the U.S. dollar by early 2015.
30 The
West's purposes for the sanctions are to signal the unified international disapproval and to alter Russia's foreign policy in Eastern Ukraine. Russia is certainly economically impacted by its aggressive policy; however, this may not be an effective way to break the stubborn resolve of Putin's silovarchy. Dissolving the silovarchs' power will not be achieved by placing travel bans and sanctions on Russia's remaining oligarchs and silovarchs, or by excluding Russia from the G8 summits.
31
By limiting the ability of the elite to integrate themselves into the global community and marketplace, sanctioning nations are effectively locking these figures into Russia instead of giving them the option to leave Russian politics for the shelter of international business. The distancing of Western markets from ROs and silovarchs may dilute Western influence on Russian political economy, thus obscuring any of the West's future attempts at promoting Russian policy reform. As they are, the sanctions represent a regression of Russian international economic integration achieved over the last three decades. Further, slights to Russia's pride such as its exclusion from the G8 economic conferences will consolidate Putin's power, as the Russian people, feeling isolated, subscribe to Further, dealing with Russian silovarchy means dealing with a relatively small group of politicians and executives who generally have little stake in the firms they run. This consolidated state power and ownership mean that sanctions imposed by only part of the world's major economies on these individuals and firms have little personal impact, while still permitting the silovarchs and ROs to steer the economy towards other partners.
If the international community is to respond to aggressive Russian policy, then it must consider the goals of the Russian elite. The silovarchs, unlike ROs, are not predominantly motivated by financial gain, but rather, with the preservation of power. However, as capitalists, ROs are generally in favor of enhanced ties to the prosperous Western markets. Since Russian government--favored RO firms still employ many Russians, they have maintained political sway and are therefore an important factor in Russian politics. As such, oligarchs have maintained major influence in Russia, and are still very much susceptible to the allure of Western economies. The past has shown that the conversion of oligarchs into prominent international businessmen is achievable by allowing them to diversify their investment portfolios. For example, the oligarch Roman Abramovich has left Russia and now owns the Chelsea Football Club, while others such as Berezovsky (now deceased), have left Russia. 36
32 Ibid., 153. 33 Wang,"Impact of Western Sanctions," 4. 34 Mankoff, "Russia's Latest Land," 72-74. 35 Wang, "Impact of Western Sanctions," 3-4. 36 Treisman, "Putin's Silovarchs," 152. The trilateral (North American--Russian--EU) cooperation on mutual security concerns and economic interests may be the international community's best bid at both reestablishing healthy ties with Russia and thereby promoting Russian political reform. Although sanctions penalize Russia for its actions, their ineffectiveness in altering Russian policy to date necessitates a change in Western strategy. Russia's economy and, most importantly, security must benefit from changing its foreign policy to persuade both the silovarchs and ROs to support such reform. 39 Tsygankov, " Putin's Last Stand," 1-3. 40 Ibid., 7-10. 6 crisis as well as the international response to it. Two different ceasefires, known as the Minsk Protocols, have been arranged between the Ukrainian government and the separatist rebels. Although the first ceasefire agreement was frequently violated and finally abandoned, the second and current Minsk Protocol has largely held, albeit with frequent minor violations. Despite reported peace progress in Ukraine, international sanctions against Russian and Ukrainian entities have remained in full force, with the EU prolonging sanctions until at least July 31 st , 2017, and no end in sight for similar sanctions imposed by the US and other G7 nations. While these sanctions do effectively limit Russia's economic growth, a recent analysis of Russia's economic trends has revealed that the Ruble's large drop vis--à--vis the U.S. dollar is mainly the result of falling oil and gas revenue and only partly the result of sanctions. 41 Decreased oil revenue, which supports about 50 per cent of Russia's annual budget, 42 combined with sustained sanctions, could risk wearing thin Russia's currency reserves. However, with a major oil and gas production cut by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and signs of petroleum prices rebounding, 43 the Russian economy may be able to revive its growth in the long--term. In short, while international sanctions imposed on Russia have had an effect on economic growth, sanctions will likely prove increasingly ineffective in the face of a strong global oil and gas market.
Current Status of the Conflict

International Issues
Additional factors that have become relevant to international relations with Russia are its role in the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran aimed at limiting its nuclear program, North Korea's nuclear armament, and the emergence of the insurgent militant Islamic movement known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Islamic State and Daesh. The fast--spreading, spontaneous, and diffuse nature of ISIL's terror cells has catalyzed a concerted international anti--terrorism effort, involving much of the international community including the U.S., EU, Canada, the Middle East, and Russia. Additionally, Russia's ties with North Korea give it the unique opportunity of asserting its influence to help dismantle North Korea's nuclear program. The North Korean threat, its role in negotiating the JCPOA There is, however, still a Western presence in Ukraine known as operation UNIFIER. UNIFIER is a military training program which involves the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. Operation UNIFIER has achieved moderate success in empowering the Ukrainian armed forces through additional training capabilities and should be continued if not expanded upon. Providing training and non--lethal foreign aid is a key factor to success: a strong Ukraine absolutely requires non--lethal aid. However, if the gridlock in Eastern Ukraine continues over the long--term despite the sanctions, the divide will predictably deepen amongst sanctioning countries, some of whom, such as Poland, rely heavily on Russian imports and exports.
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This will most likely lead to some countries' parliaments not voting to continue with the sanctions. If long--term sanctions are the only major tool the international community is willing to use as a deterrent, and they continue to prove ineffective in steering Russia's aggressive foreign policy away from Ukraine, then there will be few options left to choose from that don't involve lethal aid or support. In this scenario, it may not be a question of whether lethal aid is appropriate, but of how lethal the aid should be. All options, diplomatic and economic, should be exhausted prior to providing lethal aid to Ukraine, as this could have undesired consequences that go well beyond the current conflict.
Conclusion
Instead of pushing Russia towards integration with emergent Asian and South American economies, the most promising bid to reestablish ties with Russia may be achieved by focusing on regional security and economic stability -a trilateral mutual interest that is of top priority amongst the silovarchs and ROs. Due to Russia's historical and political dynamics from the 1990s to the present, it has been suggested that, rather than sanctions, enhanced Eastern European and Eurasian security along with Russia is a strategically important player internationally; as such, any international response to Russian policy must be conducive to continued cooperation in resolving conflicts outside of Ukraine. Despite a post--Cold War low in international relations with Russia, common issues such as North Korea, Iran's nuclear program, and terrorism represent opportunities for collaboration and potential long--term reconciliation. While sanctions focus on penalizing Russian silovarchy and oligarchs for their current intervention in Ukraine, a measured international response must be forward--looking, constructive, and mutually beneficial if it wishes to sway a small authoritarian Russian elite to reform its policies. Sanctions represent a wedge between international relations and Russia, while, to date, being an ineffective tool to catalyze Russian policy reform. The West's strategy to counter Russia's Ukraine policy, which largely constitutes sanctions, should therefore be reassessed.
